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2 Evidence Advisory System - Colombia 
 
1 Introduction 
 
This paper describes the evidence advisory system (EAS) for health policymaking in Colombia, an 
upper-middle income country located in north-west South America. Colombia is challenged by 
ongoing armed conflict between various groups in different regions of the country, acts of 
terrorism associated with these armed conflicts, and the social and political consequences of 
Colombia’s central position within the global trade in illegal narcotics. These contextual factors 
have influenced the formation of the political culture, leading to the formation of deeply 
embedded patron-client relationships within all levels of government, and corruption (Dargent 
2015). As an example of the extent of social and political conflict, at the time of writing (November 
There has been a growing global concern for improving the use of evidence to inform health policy in 
recent years. Increasingly there is recognition that individual projects or programmes building evidence 
synthesis skills, may be limited in their effect without a broader consideration of the systems in place 
which ‘embed’ or ‘institutionalise’ evidence informed policy making practices (Alliance for Health Policy 
and Systems Research and WHO 2007).  
The GRIP-Health programme is a five- year project supported by the European Research Council which 
studies the political nature of health policy to understand how to best improve the use of evidence. This 
explicitly political lens enables us to focus on the contested nature of health issues as well as the 
institutions that shape the use of evidence in health policy making. We understand institutions as 
including both formal structures and rules, as well as informal norms and practices (Lowndes and 
Roberts 2013). The GRIP-Health programme follows the World Health Organization’s view that Ministries 
of Health remain the ultimate stewards of a nation’s health, and further play a key role in providing 
information to guide health decisions (World Health Organization 2000, Alvarez-Rosette, Hawkins et al. 
2013). As such, GRIP-Health is particularly concerned with the structures and rules created by 
government to gather, synthesise, or otherwise provide evidence to inform policy making. 
This working brief is one of a series of six briefs covering a set of countries in which the GRIP-Health 
programme is undertaking research. This brief presents an overview of what is termed the ‘Evidence 
Advisory System’ (EAS) for health policy making within the country of interest, which is taken to 
encompass the key entry points through which research evidence can make its way into relevant health 
policy decisions. This can include both formal (government mandated) and informal structures, rules, 
and norms in place.  
Individual reports in this series can be useful for those considering how to improve evidence use in 
specific country settings, while taken together the reports identify the differences that can be seen 
across contexts, permitting reflection or comparison across countries about how evidence advisory 
systems are structured – including which responsibilities are given to different types of bodies, and how 
well evidence advice aligns with decision making authority structures.  
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2016), the agreement reached through a peace process negotiated between the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian government has been rejected by 
referendum.  
 
These deep-rooted and long standing political and societal divides are reflected in health policy 
and health policymaking. Colombia has mandatory health insurance under regulated competition 
of both insurance and care providers through a managed care model (Bernal, Forero et al. 2012). 
Since its inception in 1993, the Colombian health system has remained deeply contested. Deep 
ideological disagreements have been sustained on issues such as the financing of the system 
(insurance versus taxation based); the involvement of the private sector; and whether limits can 
or should be placed on the right to health care. Policy debates almost exclusively focus on health 
system reforms, to the exclusion of other policy issues. Still, despite the various proposals, it has 
also proven resilient to decisive reform. 
Throughout this 20-year long process of reform, scientific research has been conducted on the 
extent of the health system sustainability problem and on the scope of the solutions pursued. 
Most of this evidence has been produced in-country, either by government departments or by 
research institutes, universities or other organisations commissioned by the government. While 
this reflects a long-standing interest in the use of evidence to inform health policy, an increase in 
such interest has taken place over the last five years. To illustrate, changes have been made to the 
EAS, including the establishment of new evidence advisory bodies, and health technology 
assessment (HTA) has been embraced – reflected in the setting up of the Institute of Health 
Technology Assessment (Instituto de Evaluación de Tecnologías Sanitarias, IETS).  
2 Background to Colombia 
 
As of 2015, the Colombian population was estimated at just over 48 million, with a GDP of US$ 
292.1 billion. This represents a GDP per capita of US$ 6056 (The World Bank 2016).  
 
Colombia is a presidential democracy. The President of the Republic is elected every four years 
to become the Chief of State, the Chief of Government and the highest administrative authority. 
Parliament is formed of a bicameral Congress with a Senate (Senado), and a Chamber of 
Representatives (Cámara de Representantes). Both chambers have similar roles in the 
formulation and passing of policies. The electoral system is proportional; however, there is very 
low electoral participation (below 50% in legislative elections) and the party system is very weak 
(parties do not have strong bureaucracies and structures, but are dependent upon their 
charismatic leaders). Formal legislation is passed through the bicameral legislature, although 
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many controversial issues are unable to be passed and are resolved through judicial mechanisms. 
The constitutional court (and lower order courts) is an extremely powerful actor, playing a quasi-
legislative role through its guarantee of citizens’ rights to health services - e.g. through its 
adjudication on ‘tutelas’ – formal legal challenges brought by individuals to have insurance 
companies provide treatments (Cepeda-Espinosa 2004).   
 
Colombia is “mildly” decentralized, with power transferred to 32 departments and 5 districts 
(including the Distrito Capital de Bogotá) and to lower local authorities (sub-departmental 
entities, municipalities and villages). Departments have autonomy to manage their own sectional 
affairs and to plan and promote economic and social development within their territory.  
 
The health policy process in Colombia involves a range of different institutions across the 
different branches of government as well as non-state actors (e.g. civil society organisations, 
health insurers, service providers, academia and professional organisations). The governance of 
the health system is extremely fragmented, reflecting the complexity of the health system itself 
(Yamin and Parra-Vera 2010, Bernal and Gutiérrez 2012). Mandatory health insurance under 
regulated competition was introduced in 1993. The Empresas Promotoras de salud (EPS) manage 
the affiliation and registering of people, and organise and ensure the provision of basic services 
called the Plan Obligatorio de Salud (POS). The POS includes the integral protection of families, 
maternity care, health information, health promotion, diagnostics, treatment and rehabilitation 
for all diseases. Multiple private health care providers (the Instituciones Prestadoras de Servicios, 
IPS) enter into contractual arrangements with the EPS. People receive health care services within 
the health insurance system by entering through either the contributory regime (all residents 
with a legal work contract or with fixed income able to pay insurance contributions) or the 
subsidized regime for the poor and vulnerable. Those affiliated to the contributory and subsidized 
regimes freely choose their EPS to register with the beneficiary. The health insurance system is 
financed through the Solidarity and Guarantee Fund, which is supported by the insurance 
contributions of those under the contributory regime. In addition, the public health component 
of the system, which includes collective interventions for health promotion and prevention – such 
as awareness and information campaigns- is financed by the territorial health entities and 
provided by local hospitals (Giedion and Uribe 2009, Bernal, Forero et al. 2012, Chernichovsky, 
Guerrero et al. 2012).  
 
The Colombian health system has achieved high public coverage rates and has made significant 
progress in the control of infectious diseases as well as reducing maternal and infant mortality 
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(World Health Organization 2012). To illustrate, the maternal mortality ratio has declined 
significantly from 118 deaths per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 64 deaths in 2015 (World Health 
Organization 2015). Similarly, reported confirmed cases of malaria have steadily declined over 
the last decade with 40,760 confirmed cases in 2014 compared with 142,241 confirmed cases in 
2004 (World Health Organization 2015). Total expenditure on health as % of GDP (2014) was 7.2 
(World Health Organization 2016).  
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3 Primary decision making points for health 
While there is a general use of terminology such as ‘Evidence Based Policy’ or ‘Evidence Informed Policy’ in the 
health sector, what ‘policy’ is, is all but unambiguous. ‘Policy’ can refer to a range of concepts from projects 
and programmes, to sector-specific plans, to broad statements of intent (Hogwood and Gunn 1984). Policy is 
also not the responsibility of a single body; rather, policy decisions affecting health take place across a range of 
governmental levels and authorities.   
This lack of a universal object of study complicates health policy research. However, there are some types of 
decisions common to many countries’ health sectors for which research evidence is often held as critical. This 
allows a basic classification of decision types to provide at least a starting point for comparisons/analyses of 
country evidence advisory systems, as follows: 
- Public Health and Health Promotion: Usually high level decisions affecting large segments of the 
population. Can involve agencies outside the health service and broader sectoral interests. Often the 
responsibility of national legislatures, ministries of health, or devolved authorities. Common examples 
include: tobacco control, occupational health, healthy eating, sanitation, etc. A broad range of 
evidence will be relevant to such decisions, including epidemiological, economic, social attitude, and 
others which speak to relevant decision criteria. 
- Health Service Priority Setting and Management: Decisions concerned with the allocation of resources 
across the health system or the structure of service provision and funding, including priorities within 
the system. Often the responsibility of Ministries of Health or national health services. Common 
examples: Health system priorities, health worker responsibilities, resource generation or allocation 
decisions, etc. Relevant evidence forms include health technology appraisals/assessments (HTA), 
epidemiological and clinical studies, health services research, etc. 
- Programme Planning: Decisions within the remit of specialised agencies, such as programmes 
dedicated to individual conditions (malaria, HIV, cancer, etc.). Decisions within these bodies often 
require evidence both about efficacy or cost effectiveness of different prevention and treatment 
options, but equally often are informed by locally generated data (e.g. routine data from surveillance 
or facility information). 
- Service Provider Decision Making is the most specific and tailored to individual cases. It can be health 
centre or hospital policies, or individual clinician decisions about patient care. Relevant evidence may 
include specific case details or specific realities of the context as well as more top-down use of 
guidelines.  
In addition to these types of health decisions, this working paper also recognises that decision making for 
health can take place at different levels within government hierarchies, with authority for decisions, and entry 
points for evidence resting in: national level bodies, sub-national (regional) level bodies, and local level bodies 
at times. In different country settings the various decision types listed above might be addressed at any of 
these three levels or may cut across more than one level. For instance, at the national level, the Ministry of 
Health usually functions as a decision point for certain types of decisions, but movements towards de-
centralisation might lead to the shifting of decision-making from national levels to sub-national or local levels 
(England is a case study of that). This permits consideration of whether systems of evidentiary advice are well 
aligned with the decision authority structures in a setting. There can also be important considerations on the 
ways that national evidence systems link to influential non-state decision makers (e.g. development partners 
in low and middle income settings, or corporate bodies granted authority for health policy decisions).  
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3.1 National Bodies 
3.1.1 Legislature  
 
Congress (Camara de Representantes/ Senado); 
The legislative branch of the government is formed of a bicameral Congress – with a Senate 
(Senado), and a Chamber of Representatives (Cámara de Representantes). Both chambers have a 
similar role: in addition to discussing laws submitted by the government, both can initiate the 
formulation of policies. Draft laws need to be approved by both chambers (Alcántara 1999). 
 
The Congress passes laws. There are different types of laws according to the topic: Statutory Laws 
(leyes estatutarias), Organic Laws (leyes orgánicas) and Ordinary Laws (leyes ordinarias). The 
hierarchy of laws is therefore granted by the importance of the topic they legislate. Typically, the 
types of health policy decisions taken by the Congress are in the form of ordinary laws, indeed all 
health laws passed since 1991 have been in the form of ordinary laws, with the exception of one 
statutory law. Statutory laws are determined by the nature of the themes that these norms 
regulate, which are explicitly stated in the Constitution, and thus may be applicable to a potential 
health policy if it affects “fundamental rights and obligations for people and the procedures and 
resources for the protection of these”. Statutory laws are reviewed by the Constitutional Court 
before the President signs them. In health policy, there has only been one statutory law, the 
recently passed Law 1751 of 2015 (Congreso de Colombia 2015), because it aimed to establish 
the content of the right to health and the responsibility of the State on health, as well as the criteria 
to ensure that compliance with the right to health is met (Hernández 2013). 
 
3.1.2 Executive 
President of the Republic  
As Head of State and Head of Government, the President signs laws and norms approved by 
Congress, has special presidential prerogatives, makes executive policy decisions, and acts as 
arbitrator over policy conflicts. 
Recent examples of health policy decisions illustrate these three roles:  
a) Settling over (health) policy conflict: 
 In the scenario of high ideological confrontation over the reform of the Law 100 of 1993 
that created the health system, Minister Gaviria had intended a health reform through 
ordinary legislation. However, reflecting the substantial power over health policy in 
Colombia, the National Doctors Council (Gran Junta Médica Nacional) made a 14-points 
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presentation to President Santos himself in December 2012. The president took on board 
their proposals and decided to take these forward through a Statutory Law to establish 
the content of the right to health and the responsibility of the State on health, as well as 
the criteria to ensure that compliance with the right to health is met. In parallel, Minister 
Gaviria´s Ordinary law was also to be introduced in Parliament to define the structure of 
the health system that would make real the right to health regulated by the Statutory Law.     
 
b) Using special presidential prerogatives: 
 The congress’ regulation allows a series of extraordinary procedures to deal with certain 
situations. One of them is an “urgency message” where the president requests a higher 
priority for an issue in the decision-making process, requiring it to last no more than 30 
days in each chamber. This was the case of the recently promulgated Law 1751 of 2015 
(which materialised the draft Statutory Law Proyecto de ley estatutaria 209 de 2013 
Senado, 267 de 2013 Cámara) that regulated that the right to health care went through the 
urgency procedure which meant joint deliberation and voting of the First Commission of 
the Senate and the First Commission of the Chamber of Representatives.  
 Emergency Decrees are special decrees that have the strength of a law, but which require 
the prior declaration by the president of a “state of exception” that gives him the power 
to produce these kind of norms. These decrees are subject to immediate constitutional 
evaluation by the Constitutional Court. For example, in 2009, president Uribe declared a 
“state of economic, social or ecological emergency” which granted him special powers to 
produce a series of decrees to reform particular aspects of the health system. However, 
the Constitutional Court finally declared the state of emergency unconstitutional and 
annulled the Emergency Decrees. 
 
c) Making executive decisions in health: 
 Health policies are presented to the Congress as “project laws” by the Minister of Health, 
but these will have been previously agreed and decided collectively within the executive 
branch. Recently, a directive of President Santos has strengthened the role of the 
President over lower norms produced by ministers, requesting that all resolutions 
(norms which are below laws and decrees) proposed by ministries be first reviewed by 
the President Office.  
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The Executive 
While long-term (effective) planning does not seem to happen regularly in public policy in 
Colombia (some interviewees declaring that “long-term planning is absent”), the National 
Planning Department (Departamento Nacional de Planeación) is a technical-administrative 
department with Ministerial status (e.g. Cabinet representation) that contributes to making 
programmatic plans in health. 
3.1.3 The Ministry of Health 
 
In 2011, the Ministry of Social Protection, which previously included labour, social security and 
health, was split in two. The new Ministry of Health and Social Protection (Ministerio de Salud y 
Protección Social, MSPS) was then established, with responsibility for: (i) formulating health 
policy/setting goals; (ii) identifying intervention strategies; (iii) policy coordination; (iv) capacity 
planning; (v) resource allocation; (vi) securing resources (financing); (vii) regulation; (viii) cost 
control; (ix) monitoring and information control; and (x) international relations (Ministry of 
Health and Social Protection 2012).  
Being an insurance based health system, the MSPS primarily steers health care by setting the 
mandatory basic service package (the Plan Obligatorio de Salud (POS)) and regulating the system, 
although it does not have a direct managerial input on health care facilities.  
The Minister is appointed and removed by the President but there appears to be quite strong 
independence of the bureaucracy. According to Minister of Health Gaviria, for instance, the 
Ministry is now “a technocratic fortress”, implying that the Ministry itself and dependent bodies 
are no longer politicised. Quoting Minister Gaviria, “decisions are now made independently of 
electoral politics” (Amat 2015). 
3.1.4 The Judiciary 
 
The judiciary plays a particularly important role in health policymaking in Colombia. It has been 
described as a “protagonist” in health and health policymaking to an extent unparalleled in any 
other country (Rodríguez Garavito 2012). Some literature has coined the term “judicialization of 
health policy” to mark the involvement of the judiciary in health and health policy development 
as well as the tendency to take to the courts issues that would, in other countries (of a similar 
level of economic development or comparable level of judicial activism), be resolved by the health 
system administrative and regulatory instruments (Rodríguez Garavito 2012).  
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The Constitutional Court 
The Constitutional Court (Corte Constitucional) (CC), created in 1991, has a quasi-legislative role 
over health policy issues, often on the most controversial issues in which legislation is politically 
problematic or when the legislative and executive bodies have failed to act (i.e. the update of the 
POS). It has been noted that “in recent times, social and political actors have gradually deferred 
to the Court for the resolution of their most difficult questions”, giving the CC the ultimate say in 
cases where fundamental human rights are called into question (Cepeda-Espinosa 2004). This 
has the potential to create precedents and set parameters for future judgements. The CC is 
composed of magistrates elected by the Senate of the Republic. The elected justices of the CC serve 
for a non-renewable eight-year period (Cepeda-Espinosa 2004). 
3.2 Sub-National Bodies 
 
Colombia devolves some power and authority to 32 departments and 5 districts and other sub-
departmental entities and local authorities (municipalities and villages).  Departments have 
autonomy to manage their own sectional affairs and to plan and promote economic and social 
development within their territory.  In particular, public health (including collective 
interventions for health promotion and prevention – such as awareness and information 
campaigns) are financed by the territorial departments. 
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4 Entry points for research evidence – The evidence advisory 
system 
 
 
In Colombia, a wide range of evidence is produced ‘in-country’ (by research institutes or other 
organisations commissioned by the government or the ministries) and even ‘in-house’ (i.e. within 
the MoH or other health authorities, including surveys and primary health data).  
For example, as an attempt to generate knowledge to support the implementation of Law 100 
which set up the Colombian health system, a Program for Supporting the Health Reform 
(Programa de Apoyo a la Reforma de Salud, PARS) was introduced in 1996 with the financial and 
technical support of the Inter-American Development Bank. The Program aimed to provide 
technical assistance and capacity building, to produce specialised research and strategies to 
transfer such knowledge to decision-makers at the MoH. More than 100 analytical studies and 
consultancy projects were developed over the years the PARS was in operation until it finished 
in 2008, producing 18 publications on different aspects of the project (Ministerio de la Protección 
Social and Gesaworld 2008).   
At the national government level, the Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP) is a technical-
administrative department with Ministerial status (e.g. Cabinet representation), responsible for 
the planning and development of economic and social policies. The DNP acts as executive 
secretariat of the national council of economic and social policies (CONPES, Consejo Nacional de 
For research evidence to inform policy, it must have a conduit through which it can reach decision 
makers who might be usefully informed by it. There may be a wide range of structures and norms in 
place, both formal and informal, which, when taken together, form the evidence advisory system for 
health decision making. Taking as our starting point the stewardship role of Ministries of Health (and, by 
extension, national legislatures which govern ministries), we separate between  
1.  ‘Formal systems’- taken here to represent the officially mandated agencies tasked with evidence 
synthesis and provision for decision making processes. These can be within national 
governments (for example, Ministry of Health Research Departments), Semi-autonomous bodies 
(such as the National Institute of Health and Care Excellence – NICE – in the UK), or independent 
agencies, so long as they have a formal mandate to provide evidence to inform policy; and 
 
2. ‘Informal systems’ - representing the systems of evidence provision that are not dictated by any 
formal decree or rule to provide evidence, but which are found to play important roles in 
evidence provision. 
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Políticas Económicas y Sociales), which is the maximum national advisory body for the 
government in charge of policy planning. However, as the policy capacity of ministries, and 
specifically the MoH, has increased, they are assuming some planning functions from DNP. A key 
activity of the DNP is the production of strategy documents (CONPES) for the government in 
specific economic and social policy areas, within the remit of the National Development Plan 
(Departamento Nacional de Planeación 2016)1. 
A recent analysis has argued that “[t]he interest of the Colombian government in relying on 
scientific evidence to better inform health policies began in the mid-2000s, but it has only been 
in the last three years [since 2011] that policymakers have paid attention to the methods and 
processes for assessing and appraising the evidence used in other countries” (Castro 2014). This 
has led to a change in the EAS and the establishment of new institutional arrangements explained 
below. 
 
4.1 Formal systems  
 
There is no formal body responsible for setting health research priority at the national policy level 
in Colombia.  The MoH and dependent bodies, such as the Instituto Nacional de Salud (INS), aim 
to align their research strategies and objectives annually (i.e. the INS strategic plan has to be 
approved by the MoH); however, the MoH does not have an identifiable research unit. As such 
there is no unique central hub of evidence generation in the Ministry; the closest seems to be the 
Advisory Office for Planning and Sectoral Studies (Oficina Asesora de Planeación de Estudios 
Sectoriales) within the Minister Office – a MSPS unit that provides advice to the Minister of Health. 
Instead, each unit and directorate within the Ministry appears to be responsible for its own areas 
of expertise. Units contract out research to produce evidence for designing policies (i.e. a series 
of studies on the financing of the subsidized regime were paid by the Ministry from a loan given 
by the Inter-American Development Bank). 
Prior to 2012, the EAS for health in Colombia was structured around the Regulatory Commission 
for Health (Comisión de Regulación en Salud, CRES), a decision-making body set up in 2007, 
ascribed to the MoH with the role of, among other tasks, updating the basket of services (POS). 
“In December 2011, in compliance with the constitutional court´s mandate, POS content was 
updated by the CRES. However, it received considerable criticism from the media and the 
                                                             
1 We have concluded that the DNP has not a role in evidence synthesis and dissemination as well, but rather as 
“user of evidence” for policy making. Hence it is not included in the formal EAS mapping. 
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academic community due to the inadequate use of evidence and weakness of methods, but also 
the lack of transparency within the decision-making process”(Castro 2014). In an effort to 
respond to such criticisms, the government created the Institute of Health Technology 
Assessment (Instituto de Evaluación de Tecnologías Sanitarias, IETS) in September 2012 to inform 
the CRES (see below). However, only a few months later, in December 2012, the CRES was 
abolished and the MoH “re-assumed its role of resource-allocation decision-maker” (Castro 
2014). While there may not be a central coordinated research unit, the MoH does have a series of 
organizations ascribed to it with responsibilities for evidence provision through their mandate to 
advise on decisions in health, including: the Instituto Nacional de Salud (INS) (the National Health 
Institute); the Instituto de Evaluación de Tecnologíca en Salud (IETS) (Institute of Health 
Technology Assessment); and the Instituto Nacional de Vigilancia de Medicinas y Alimentos 
(INVIMA) (National Institute for the Vigilance of Medicines and Food).  
 
IETS 
Created in September 2012, the Institute of Health Technology Assessment (Instituto de 
Evaluación Tecnológica en Salud, IETS) is a not-for profit public-private partnership (corporación 
sin ánimo de lucro, de participación mixta y de carácter privado)(Instituto de Evaluación 
Tecnológica en Salud 2013) participated by four public sector members (the Ministry of Health 
(MSPS); the drug regulator INVIMA; the National Health Institute (INS); and the administrative 
department of science, technology and innovation (Colciencias) (Colciencias 2016) and two 
private sector members (the Colombian Association of Faculties of Medicine 
(ASCOFAME)(Ascofame 2016); and the Colombian Association of Scientific Societies (Asociación 
Colombiana de Sociedades Científicas 2013).  
The role of IETS is to provide non-binding recommendations about health technologies and 
clinical practice. Modelled on the British National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE), the IETS:  
(i) conducts evaluations of health technologies (including medicines, medical devices, 
diagnostics and clinical procedures, public health programs);  
(ii) supports the design, evaluation and dissemination of evidence-based clinical practice; 
and  
(iii) provides training to health professionals on evidence-based medicine, best clinical 
practice, decision-making. 
 
The IETS has developed a policy of transparency that stipulates conflicts of interest (Instituto de 
Evaluación Tecnológica en Salud 2013); for example, IETS members would not participate as 
speakers in any event directly organized or funded by the pharmaceutical industry. All IETS 
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collaborators or actors involved in their health technology appraisals (HTA) have to sign conflict 
of interest declarations that are then reviewed by a Conflict of Interest Committee who would 
ultimately decide whether the person is authorised to participate or collaborate with IETS. 
Direct public participation and consultation is limited for IETS. Assessments are made public on 
the IETS website, which has an area called ‘participation’ in which members of the public can 
upload information or request information about existing IETS activities.  
 
INS 
The National Health Institute (Instituto Nacional de Salud) (INS) is an arm´s length scientific-
technical body with its own legal status, own budget and administrative autonomy, ascribed to 
the MoH. The INS is responsible for knowledge transfer and dissemination in health. It works 
closely with universities and scientific and professional associations, undertaking and 
commissioning research.  
 
Of a 23-long list of INS functions stated by law, those of special relevance for the purpose of the 
GRIP-research project are to (Instituto Nacional de Salud 2016): 
1. “Generate, develop, apply and transfer scientific knowledge...which should speed up the 
use of that knowledge in strategies prediction, prevention, diagnosis, treatment and 
control desirable for the benefit of the health of the human population”. 
2. “Conduct research and knowledge management in public health, in accordance with 
policies, plans and guidelines of the Administrative Department of Science, Technology 
and Innovation and the Ministry of Health and Social Protection”. 
3. “Participate and provide advice on the development of scientific and technical standards 
and technical procedures in public health”. 
4. “To promote, coordinate, direct and conduct studies and research to evaluate the 
effectiveness of interventions to improve public health in the context of the powers of the 
state”. 
5. “Create and coordinate a network of scientific and technical research in public health, in 
which all the entities that carry out research, validation and technology transfer in public 
health sciences, in order to contribute to the achievement all rational scientific capacity 
available in the country in this field”. 
6.  “Participate in the evaluation of public health technologies, in matters within its 
competence”. 
7. Research, develop, produce, market and provide essential goods and services in public 
health, in accordance with the parameters set by the Ministry of Health and Social 
Protection, directly or through alliances or strategic partnerships. 
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The INS may also evaluate policies and health technologies, and thus has some overlap with IETS. 
One of the roles of the INS has been providing technical assistance to local authorities to 
strengthen their research capacity. However, interviewees have been sceptical about the ability 
of INS to carry out these tasks (“INS don´t go to medical congresses!”, interview 11). Dependent 
upon the INS, the health observatory (Observatorio Nacional de Salud) conducts analyses of the 
health situation in Colombia by monitoring health indicators and identifies knowledge gaps that 
require research prioritization (Instituto Nacional de Salud 2016).  
 
INVIMA 
The National Institute for the Vigilance of Medicines and Food (Instituto Nacional de Vigilancia de 
Medicinas y Alimentos, INVIMA) is the food and drug regulator. It was set up as a technical 
scientific public body with its own legal status, administrative autonomy and own budget, 
ascribed to the MoH. INVIMA is responsible for: (i) drug quality control; (ii) the inspection, 
vigilance and control of the medicines manufacturing and distribution processes; (iii) the 
inspection, vigilance and control of food manufacturing and distribution processes; (iv) 
establishing the technical norms and guidelines for medicines use; etc (Instituto Nacional de 
Vigilancia de Medicinas y Alimentos (INVIMA) 2016).  
 
4.2 Informal systems  
 
A great deal of knowledge synthesis is undertaken by universities and research institutes for the 
government on a consultancy basis (interview 13; interview 14). The list of institutes includes: 
PROESA; the Centro Economía Salud, CES (linked to Universidad de Antioquia); the Centro de 
Investigación de Desarrollo (Universidad Nacional); the Universidad de los Andes; CENDEX 
(Universidad Javeriana); and the Centro de Investigaciones Salud de la Fudnación SantaFe de 
Bogotá. 
  
The World Bank also has played an important de-facto advisory role, supporting the country with 
technical studies on different health issues including the definition of the health benefits 
packages, risk assessment, and decentralisation in health. In particular, the World Bank is 
supporting the development of health indicators through the funding of projects led by research 
centres.  
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4.3 The Courts 
 
The Constitutional Court (CC) justices who review tutelas are able to consult with experts, public 
officials and organizations before resolving, in order to “bring facts and conflicting perceptions of 
social reality to the Court´s attention” (Cepeda-Espinosa 2004). The participatory nature of the 
CC´s decision-making process thus brings the opportunity to present and incorporate relevant 
evidence.  
 
5 Discussion 
 
There are a range of challenges and concerns that our overview of the EAS in Colombia has 
highlighted that can affect how well evidence can be used to inform health policy making.  
First, Ministers are changed frequently by the President, and, with each replacement, the top civil 
servants and cadres are also changed. Thus, the timeframe for implementing policies is very short.  
There is also great disparity between departments regarding their ability to design, formulate 
and implement health decisions (let alone evidence-informed decisions).  Particularly strong in 
generating local evidence on health needs and formulating local health interventions is the 
Distrito Capital de Bogotá.  
The existence of the IETS does not guarantee a NICE-like (political-technical) approach to 
decision making in Colombia. Interviewees pointed that such approach is currently impossible 
because nobody wants to discuss placing limits on service provision or even to discuss the metrics 
which could be used to do that e.g. to come up with a price per DALY (interview 8; interview 11). 
For example, doctors’ associations openly reject the legitimacy of IETS in setting up limits to and 
rationing health benefits and services. In addition, the constitutional court put a barrier to this 
type of mechanism through its expansionist rulings on health service provision (via constitutional 
right to services). Moreover, the strong independence of the bureaucracy appears to insulate 
technical advisory bodies like IETS from significant engagement with the public, which includes 
consideration of social values outside those established as important within HTA (e.g. cost-
effectiveness is a social value build into much HTA thinking). While modelled on the British 
system, it is worth noting that NICE has explicit consideration of other social values used to guide 
final decisions on services to provide, and further holds public consultations to this effect. In 
commenting on the differences between the UK and Colombian system, Castro states that: “[i]t is 
worth noting that the UK has a relatively long tradition of performing and using the results from 
economic evaluations, applying willingness to pay (WTP) thresholds and including stakeholders 
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throughout assessment processes (Castro 2014). In Colombia, on the other hand, stakeholder 
engagement or the consideration of societal values are not current practice and the institutional 
arrangements for reimbursement decision-making and communicating of decisions to the 
general public are yet to be implemented (Castro 2014). 
 
One of the roles of the INS is to provide technical assistance to local authorities to strengthen their 
research capacity. However, interviewees have been sceptical about the ability of INS to carry out 
these tasks (“INS don´t go to medical congresses!”, interview 11). 
The establishment of new evidence advisory bodies and the embrace of HTA is also fairly recent. 
According to interview 21, until 2011-2012, “decision-making has been ad-hoc and has not 
considered the best available evidence”. The existence of evidence and a strong research capacity 
(both within and outside national government) in Colombia does not guarantee the uptake of 
evidence in health policy making. While the technical capacity of the MoH is basically good, it lacks 
the ability to lead the health policy making process and to be strategic (it is rather reactive to 
issues) (interview 6). Further, the country has not had a tradition of up-taking evidence for health 
priority setting, long-term planning, health sector reforms, etc. (Castro 2014). For example, HTA 
has “played a limited role in Colombia in terms of providing information to set priorities, allocate 
resources or formulate evidence-based policies for health and health care” (Castro 2014). During 
the early 1990s, a few academics who had been trained on HTA techniques overseas produced 
“isolated pieces of research using methods related to those of evidence-based medicine (EBM) 
and health technology assessment (HTA)” (Castro 2014). However, it did not gain sufficient 
prominence as to become common practice for decision makers or as to become formalised. It 
remains to be seen how well the newly established systems will function or whether they will be 
sustained. 
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